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Among the collective wisdom about large corporate bankruptcy cases, the following points
are almost undisputed: Longer chapter 11 cases cost more; prepackaged chapter 11 cases cost
less; cases filed in New York or Delaware cost more; and fee examiners control the costs of big
chapter 11 cases. But each of these points is wrong, and in most cases entirely backward. This
Article provides empirical evidence to show why. Ultimately, I argue that the complexity of the
bankruptcy and the compensation structure of the professionals retained (which may itself reflect
further aspects of complexity) are the key determinants of cost. The key questions of chapter 11
cost are subtle and difficult to tease out; and I end this paper urging more subtlety and modesty
going forward.
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ABSTRACT 
Among the collective wisdom about large corporate bankruptcy 
cases, the following points are almost undisputed: Longer chapter 11 
cases cost more; prepackaged chapter 11 cases cost less; cases filed in 
New York or Delaware cost more; and fee examiners control the costs of 
big chapter 11 cases. But each of these points is wrong, and in most 
cases entirely backward. This Article provides empirical evidence to 
show why. Ultimately, I argue that the complexity of the bankruptcy and 
the compensation structure of the professionals retained (which may 
itself reflect further aspects of complexity) are the key determinants of 
cost. The key questions of chapter 11 cost are subtle and difficult to 
tease out; and I end this paper urging more subtlety and modesty going 
forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the collective wisdom about large corporate bankruptcy 
cases, the following points are almost undisputed: 
 Longer chapter 11 cases cost more1 
 Prepackaged chapter 11 cases cost less2 
 Cases filed in New York and Delaware cost more.3 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional 
Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMP. L. STUD. 111, 120 (2004) 
[hereinafter Determinants of Professional Fees]; see also Edward I. Altman, Evaluating 
the chapter 11 Bankruptcy-Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2-4 
(1993); Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms 
in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 747-48, 751 (1989); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall 
S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of 
Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 295 (2001) (theorizing that “fees 
may be correlated roughly with the length of the bankruptcy proceeding. The longer the 
proceeding, the greater the fees.”); James J. White, Harvey’s Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 467, 473-74 (1995) (“[T]he largest and most palpable costs of chapter 11 arise from 
delay.”). 
 2. Elizabeth Tashjian et al., Prepacks: An Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged 
Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 155 (1996) (finding that “the average direct cost of 
resolving financial distress as a fraction of total assets is less in a prepack than in a 
traditional chapter 11.”); cf. Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An 
Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 
(1990) (finding that out of court restructurings are cheaper than chapter 11 cases).  
 3. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases is 
Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts 141, 141-42 (2005) [hereinafter Courting Failure] 
(arguing that Delaware and New York have fostered a culture of high fees that is 
spreading to other courts); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional 
Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 5 J. EMP. L. STUD. 983, 985 
(2008) [hereinafter Professional Overcharging] (reporting that professional fees are “32 
percent higher in forum-shopped cases.”); Determinants of Professional Fees, supra 
note 1, at 113 (arguing that under some measures, chapter 11 cost is higher in 
Delaware); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL 
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 Fee examiners control the costs of big chapter 11 cases.4 
However, each of these points is wrong, and in most cases entirely 
backward. This Article provides empirical evidence to show why. 
Engaging these myths is important not only for the sake of 
accuracy, but because of the present economic climate. In particular, in 
the midst of an economic crisis, particularly one as severe as recently 
experienced, bankruptcy becomes of interest to a wider range of people. 
The press inevitably trots out the same group of articles seen in the prior 
recession, noting how the only beneficiaries of the current climate are 
bankruptcy attorneys.5 At a point when bankruptcy is in the spotlight, 
and important policy decisions are to be made, an accurate picture of 
which tools may solve the financial crisis becomes all the more 
important. 
Most importantly, too much of the debate about chapter 11 costs 
rests on a false premise. Beyond the specific issues addressed by this 
Article, the general theme of the debate is that professional fees in 
bankruptcy represent nothing more than wealth transfers, taking value 
                                                                                                                                         
L. REV. 967, 970, 996 (1999) (discussing the costs that may be associated with filing in 
New York or Delaware); Alexander L. Paskay & Frances Pilaro Wolstenholme, chapter 
11: A Growing Cash Cow, Some Thoughts on How To Rein in the System, 1 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 331, 334-36 (1993) (discussing the high cost of chapter 11 “mega 
cases”). 
 4. Zach Lowe, Bankruptcy Fees: How Much Is Too Much?, AMLAW DAILY.COM 
(Jan. 14, 2010, 12:25 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/01/fees 
thornburg.html; see also Stipulation and Order with Respect to Appointment of a Fee 
Examiner at 2, In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09-50026-REG (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 23, 2009) (In the chapter 11 case of the former General Motors, the United States 
Trustee argued that “in light of the size and complexity of the chapter 11 cases and the 
potential costs and expenses of the professionals” in the case, a fee examiner should be 
appointed and the court ordered the appointment). 
 5. Recent examples include, Julie Creswell & Nelson D. Schwartz, Bankruptcy 
Fees Add Up in Cases Like Lehman’s, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010; William-Arthur 
Haynes, Bankruptcy Lawyers Work Overtime to Keep Up, SILICONE VALLEY/SAN JOSE 
BUS. J., Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2010 
/02/01/story5.html?b=1265000400^2810591&ana=e_vert; Robert Snell, Old GM Legal 
Fees Targeted, THE DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 29, 2010, available at http://www.detnews. 
com/article/20100429/AUTO01/4290352/1148/auto01/Old-GM-legal-fees-targeted; 
Linda Sandler, Lehman Liquidator Fees Top a Quarter-Billion Dollars, Apr. 23, 2010, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-22/lehman 
liquidator-fees-top-a-quarter-billion-dollars-update1-.html. 
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from creditors and giving it to bankruptcy professionals.6 This notion is 
particularly evident in the claims that professionals actively attempt to 
extend the length of cases in order to facilitate more billing, and in Lynn 
LoPucki’s recent claims that professionals expend substantial effort in 
conniving to extract unwarranted fees out of bankruptcy estates.7 
The wealth transfer argument depends on the odd belief that 
bankruptcy professionals would otherwise be sitting at home on the 
couch if it were not for chapter 11. But most who work on large chapter 
11 cases are very talented, quite employable, and could otherwise be 
working on mergers, bond offerings or loan agreements. These 
alternative tasks have real economic value, and professionals are 
routinely compensated for their work on such tasks, typically without 
much press or academic disparagement. Working on bankruptcy and 
chapter 11 matters means that bankruptcy professionals forgo the 
opportunity to work on other projects of this sort, and their time spent on 
chapter 11 must therefore have a value at least equivalent to these 
forgone projects. 
Being in chapter 11 means that creditors’ recovery on their claims 
becomes higher than zero.8 The professional fees are the cost of moving 
to that higher recovery. The notion that money paid to professionals 
belongs to creditors is true only if the creditors could realize that value 
without the professionals. 
But even liquidation does not happen by itself.9 Indeed, only 
abandonment of a distressed firm might be costless, if we limit our 
                                                                                                                                         
 6. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy 
Court Fee Practices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 423, 424 (2009) [hereinafter Routine 
Illegality] (“[I]n large, public-company cases, the managers rarely have significant 
interests in the estates. When they spend money on professionals they spend other 
people’s money - usually creditors’ money.”); see also Cynthia A. Baker, Other 
People’s Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 35 
(1996). The basic point is not new. Bankruptcy, 18 BULL. COM. L. LEAGUE AM., Nov. 
1913, at 25 (“These attorneys do this . . . so that the trustee will select them as his 
attorney, and thus enable them to seek large fees which come out of the pockets of the 
creditors for this representation.”). 
 7. The theme implicitly runs through many of his recent works, but is most 
evident in Professional Overcharging, supra text accompanying note 3. 
 8. Stephen J. Lubben, Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 81 (2007) 
(arguing that the average chapter 7 pays unsecured creditors no more than a “token 
amount”). 
 9. See Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate 
Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 720 (1993) 
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conception of cost to actual “out of pocket” expenditures by the debtor-
firm;10 but that obviously ignores the larger social costs. 
The cost paid to chapter 11 professionals is an example of the old 
truism that sometimes you have to spend money to make money. In 
chapter 11, creditors have to spend some money to recover some of 
what is due to them. In the main, the value of chapter 11 professionals’ 
time was never a value that creditors could capture. Pretending that fees 
paid to professionals represents a real loss to the creditors demonstrates 
little more than muddled thinking.11 
The real policy question then is whether creditors are paying too 
much to go from a 0% recovery in chapter 7 to a 40% recovery in 
chapter 11. This is a question about the efficiency of the market for 
bankruptcy professionals, because if the market is efficient the 
professionals are limited in their ability to overcharge. Even if the 
market is somewhat inefficient, we have to ask if the market is any more 
inefficient than the larger market for corporate professionals. 
Bankruptcy professionals seem to be easy to pick on, because their fees 
are disclosed in open court. However, one might suspect that this same 
fact may also make them more conservative in their billing. 
Overheated rhetoric about the hourly rates of the professionals in 
question and the millions of dollars requested in fee applications does 
nothing to advance our understanding of these key issues. It is equally 
foolish to suggest that bankruptcy professionals would work for little or 
substantially reduced compensation, or that artificially capping 
bankruptcy costs would not have an effect on how chapter 11 cases play 
out.12 For example, if a debtor could find cheaper bankruptcy counsel, 
are we sure that creditor recoveries would go up, as the conventional 
wisdom often implies, or will recoveries go down, because the cheaper 
                                                                                                                                         
[hereinafter Reply to Bradley & Rosenzweig] (noting that even an automated 
bankruptcy system would have to provide a procedure for transferring ownership of the 
debtors assets).  
 10. See generally Stephen J. Lubben & Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Involuntary Creditors 
and Corporate Bankruptcy, (October 4, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1938599 [hereinafter Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy] (citing to the 
idea that there are societal costs to even abandonment of contaminated property).  
 11. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: 
Whose Money is it Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1043-44 (1995) (noting that 
collection under any system—state or federal—involves cost to creditors). 
 12. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 288-89 (1993). 
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firm is too inexperienced or too small to handle the case? Sometimes 
you get what you pay for. 
Instead, our focus must be on: identifying how much chapter 11 
costs, how much overall value chapter 11 generates and how those 
figures compare to the available alternatives, such as state debtor-
creditor law, corporate insolvency systems used in other jurisdictions, 
and theoretical alternatives to chapter 11. Simply declaring that chapter 
11 costs are “outrageous” is no more helpful from a policy perspective 
than any other soapbox declaration of one’s personal beliefs. The 
important question is “why?” 
In short, the wealth transfer argument is one of easy rhetorical 
appeal, but little intellectual rigor. The goal of this Article is to begin a 
more careful, considerate examination of the chapter 11 system. 
Part I of this Article begins by briefly reviewing recent studies of 
chapter 11 costs. Part II then introduces the dataset used in the present 
Article. Based on the dataset I first created for the ABI chapter 11 Fee 
study,13 now augmented with additional data, this database consists of 
97 large chapter 11 cases, all filed in 2004.14 Finally, Part III develops a 
regression model of chapter 11 cost. Set forth on Table 8, my model 
explains more than 85% of the variance associated with chapter 11 
costs. 
As noted at the outset, this model also challenges several key 
assumptions about the way chapter 11 works, and how chapter 11 costs 
are incurred. In particular, I find that: 
 Time spent in chapter 11 has no relationship with cost, once 
a fully specified model is considered; 
 Prepackaged chapter 11 cases are not significantly cheaper 
than regular chapter 11 cases; 
 Cases filed in New York or Delaware do not cost more—in 
fact, these jurisdictions seem to actually reduce chapter 11 
costs; 
 Fee examiners do not reduce the costs of large chapter 11 
cases; 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. Stephen J. Lubben, Chapter 11 Professional Fee Study, AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (Nov. 1, 2007) [hereinafter ABI chapter 11 Fee Study], 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020477.  
 14. Cf. Determinants of Professional Fees, supra note 1, at 112-13 (describing 
their study of 48 cases). 
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 The complexity of the bankruptcy and the compensation 
structure for the professionals retained (which may itself 
reflect further aspects of complexity) are the key 
determinants of cost. Debtor size is only a loose proxy for 
these factors, and is itself of lesser relevance once a fuller 
model is developed. 
Complex cases are cheaper than a linear model of chapter 11 costs 
would predict. That is, there are economies of scale with regard to the 
largest cases, even if those cases receive the most criticism. 
I thus hope that this paper serves as the beginning of a more subtle, 
less combative, examination of chapter 11 and the cost thereof. 
Particularly given the current economic reality, the debate is of special 
import. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The costs of corporate reorganization are compelling in any 
recession, and particularly so in a financial crisis, such as the one we are 
currently experiencing.15 To the casual reader of the Wall Street Journal 
who still thinks of bankruptcy as the equivalent to corporate death, the 
millions of dollars paid by “bankrupt” or “insolvent” firms like Lehman 
Brothers, or Enron before it, often seems quite extreme.16  
A similar phenomenon can be seen in academic literature, dating 
back to Modigliani and Miller in 1958, and the notion that a firm’s 
capital structure amounts to little more than slices in a pie.17 In this 
world, debtor-firms are typically discussed relative to a backdrop of 
complete contracts and zero transaction costs.18 Accordingly, firms that 
encounter financial distress—that is, having liquid assets insufficient to 
meet current fixed claims—simply renegotiate their obligations and 
                                                                                                                                         
 15. For example, even the Sports section of the New York Times has included 
coverage of the issue. See Richard Sandomir, To Dodgers, Bankruptcy Incurs Cost by 
the Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, at D7. 
 16. See Liz Moyer, Lehman Bankruptcy Fees Top $1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 
2010. 
 17. See Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 
J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 99 (1988). See generally John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory 
in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 53 (1995) (“Modigliani and 
Miller argue . . . that under defined assumptions it makes no difference what the debt-
equity structure might be--the value of the firm remains the same in any event.”). 
 18. See Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, The Insignificance of Bankruptcy 
Costs to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 33 J. FIN. 383, 386 (1978). 
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proceed accordingly.19 Slight deviations from the background 
assumptions can be assumed and then addressed by neatly automated 
contractual responses.20 That Kmart, a large discount store chain, would 
pay more than $134 million to professionals to do so is inconsistent with 
this idealized understanding of the world, and thus each dollar spent is 
evidence of inefficiency.21 
Of course, both views of “bankruptcy” are based on basic 
misunderstanding or oversimplification. Both assume that financial 
distress is costless, whereas even liquidation does not happen by itself.22 
Indeed, only abandonment of a distressed firm might be costless – if we 
limit our conception of cost to actual “out of pocket” expenditures by 
the debtor-firm.23 
More broadly, understanding the cost of a corporate reorganization 
system is important because debtor-firms face the reality of a world with 
incomplete contracts, incomplete information, uncertain asset values, 
and complex capital structures that highlight the many ways in which 
assumptions about capital structure irrelevance or managerial rationality, 
or both, fail.24 Given these truths, and the added reality of asset market 
                                                                                                                                         
 19. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of 
Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1119-20 (1994) [hereafter Finance’s 
Theoretical Divide]. 
 20. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
343, 353 (1997) (“The contractual, Chameleon Equity structure has an important 
potential advantage over current bankruptcy reorganization law. Automatic conversion 
of the lowest-priority fixed-obligation class to common equity, and the survival of 
higher-priority classes, would accomplish a reorganization of an insolvent firm without 
the expensive imbroglio that is often a consequence of the current bankruptcy 
reorganization process.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate 
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 785-89, 804 (1988) (arguing for an auction of 
the debtor based on options, and that “[u]nder the method, once the size and relative 
priority of the participants’ claims are determined, the division of the reorganization pie 
will be resolved quickly and efficiently—and in perfect consistency with the 
entitlements of all the participants.”). 
 21. See Greta Guest, Bill for Kmart’s Lawyers, Consultants Exceeds $138 Million, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 3, 2003, at 1A. 
 22. See Reply to Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 720. 
 23. See Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at 16-17. 
 24. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt 
Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992); see also Douglas G. 
Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the 
Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930 (2006); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. 
Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, 
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disruptions,25 it is generally thought that reorganization structures are 
important tools to avoid excessive and economically disruptive 
liquidation of assets.26 If given a choice of possible approaches to 
reorganization, the cost of any particular system, weighed against its 
benefits, provides an obvious metric for evaluation. 
While much of the conventional wisdom about chapter 11 is non-
empirical,27 there have been several empirical studies of chapter 11 cost 
that have lent support to the larger “folklore.”28 
For example, in 1996, Elizabeth Tashjian, Ronald C. Lease, and 
John J. McConnell published a study of prepackaged29 chapter 11 cases, 
utilizing a sample of forty-nine firms that filed prepackaged chapter 11 
                                                                                                                                         
Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 126 (1990) (“Current law provides a 
complex legal environment in which representatives of thousands of creditors and 
shareholders bargain over the disposition of billions of dollars in assets.”). 
 25. Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of 
Commercial Aircraft Transactions, 53 J. FIN. 939 (1998). 
 26. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“In 
proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled 
enterprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future . . . . 
Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a 
rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap.’”). See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate 
Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy 
Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993); Elizabeth Warren 
& Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (2005). 
 27. E.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
439, 465 n.107 (1992) (“It appears that firm size is inversely related to the proportion of 
firm value lost [as a result of direct and indirect costs].”); White, supra note 1, at 470. 
 28. See, e.g., Lubben 2008, infra note 45. 
 29. This is explained in Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate 
Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large chapter 11 
Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 516 (2000) [hereinafter Lubben (2000)] (“A true 
prepack involves a prepetition solicitation of votes on a plan. A partial prepack involves 
both a prepetition solicitation (e.g., of bondholders) and a postpetition solicitation (e.g., 
of equity). Partial prepacks are usually done to avoid having to conduct a ‘registered 
prepack,’ which is subject to review and comment by the SEC, and takes substantially 
longer than a nonregistered prepack. A prearranged or prenegotiated case involves no 
prepetition solicitation, and thus is little different from a traditional chapter 11 case, 
save for the fact that a proposed plan and disclosure statement are fully drafted on the 
first day of the case.”). 
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cases between 1986 and the first six months of 1993.30 The authors 
found that prepackaged cases fall between out-of-court and chapter 11 
restructurings in terms of time, direct costs, recovery rates, and 
violations of absolute priority.31 Overall, the authors reported direct 
costs of 1.85% of assets.32 
Unfortunately, the authors only considered the “in bankruptcy” 
costs of prepackaged cases, and failed to consider that the negotiation of 
a plan without court oversight may be responsible for the apparent cost 
difference. 
In 2004, Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty reported on “one of the 
most extensive studies to date of the professional fees and expenses 
awarded by U.S. bankruptcy courts in the reorganization of large, public 
companies.”33 LoPucki and Doherty studied the professional fees and 
expenses awarded by U.S. bankruptcy courts in 48 chapter 11 cases 
involving large, public companies whose plans were confirmed between 
1998 and 2002.34 
The authors constructed a regression model of the principal 
determinants of fees and expenses applied for and awarded to the 
professionals involved in the sample’s reorganizations, in order to test 
the impact of different variables on such awards.35 They tested a number 
of different variables, including the size of the firm, the length of the 
case, the court of the bankruptcy proceeding, the number of professional 
firms involved in the case, the firm’s solvency, the type of 
reorganization plan being confirmed, the firm’s industry, the amounts of 
fee cuts imposed by the court, whether the firm was liquidated during 
the bankruptcy proceeding, whether the debtor’s lawyers were from 
New York, Delaware or another jurisdiction, whether the firm ultimately 
liquidated or reorganized, and whether the debtor’s lawyers were local 
to the court.36 However, LoPucki and Doherty ultimately settled on only 
using four variables in their regression: firm size (measured by the 
assets reported on the bankruptcy petition), case duration, the number of 
                                                                                                                                         
 30. Elizabeth Tashjian et al., supra note 2, at 135-36. As noted in Lubben (2000), 
supra note 29, the definition of “prepackaged” used in this paper likely also includes 
pre-negotiated chapter 11 cases. 
 31. Id. at 142-43. 
 32. Id. at 143. 
 33. Determinants of Professional Fees, supra note 1, at 111. 
 34. Id. at 115. 
 35. Id. at 120-21 
 36. Id. at 122-37 
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professional firms seeking fees, and the location of the bankruptcy 
proceeding.37 
Using this model, LoPucki and Doherty concluded that firm size 
and length of time between filing and confirmation were the strongest 
determinants of professional fees awarded.38 Further, the number of 
professional firms seeking reimbursement also impacted the overall 
amount of professional fees awarded, albeit causing a smaller effect than 
the first two variables.39 Using only those three factors in their 
regression analysis, LoPucki and Doherty were able to explain 77% of 
the variance of fees.40 Additionally, by controlling for those three 
variables, the authors found that fees were significantly higher for 
bankruptcy case proceedings in Delaware—approximately 32% higher 
than cases in all other states.41 
In 2008, three major empirical legal studies of chapter 11 costs 
were published. First, LoPucki and Doherty returned to their original 
model and compared it with a new model, which they asserted better 
represented pure case complexity.42 Describing the difference between 
the two regression models as the “billing opportunity” presented by a 
case, the authors asserted that professionals routinely overcharged for 
chapter 11 work.43 
Next, I produced the American Bankruptcy Institute chapter 11 Fee 
Study,44 and published a related article setting forth the results of that 
study.45 The study examined a total sample of 1,044 cases filed in 2004, 
as 945 chapter 11 cases were pooled into a “random” sample and 99 
cases were considered in a “big case” dataset. The average firm in the 
dataset had scheduled assets of $423.4 million and scheduled liabilities 
of nearly $776 million, while the average firm in the random sample had 
scheduled assets of $21.2 million and scheduled liabilities of more than 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. Id. at 120. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 130-31. 
 42. Professional Overcharging, supra note 3. 
 43. Id. at 983, 994. 
 44. Stephen J. Lubben, chapter 11 Professional Fee Study, AM. BANKR. INS. (Nov. 
1, 2007) [hereinafter ABI chapter 11 Fee Study], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1020477. 
 45. Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008) [hereinafter Lubben (2008)]. 
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$37 million.46 Lubben (2008) found that, for both samples, professional 
fees totaled 4 to 4.5 percent of the bankrupt firms’ assets and liabilities, 
but cautioned against reporting cost in relation to size, since the data 
evidenced significant economies of scale.47 
While partially confirming prior studies, such as LoPucki and 
Doherty (2004), Lubben (2008) also found that time spent in chapter 11 
was not a significant predictor of overall cost once case complexity was 
fully modeled.48 Lubben (2008) found the addition of other variables, 
such as looking at a bankrupt firm’s assets and debts, presence of 
official committees and whether there were “first day motions” filed in a 
case, were better predictors of the costs involved in a chapter 11 case.49 
The study also found no indications that filing in Delaware or New York 
resulted in greater costs.50 
Also in 2008, LoPucki and Doherty examined the growing role of 
investment bankers in modern chapter 11 practice and constructed 
regression models for specific bankruptcy professionals.51 The primary 
findings of this paper largely track those of its earlier companion papers, 
although the authors did note that “the fees of financial advisors grew at 
the rate of about 25% per year, whereas all professional fees and 
expenses as a whole grew only about 9% per year.”52 They also 
separately modeled the costs of lead debtor’s attorneys, finding that 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, a leading New York 
corporate law firm, was substantially more expensive than other debtor’s 
firms.53 They concluded that “Skadden Arps representation cost more in 
these cases because Skadden Arps billed more hours.”54 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. Id. at 93-95. 
 47. Id. at 102-04. 
 48. Id. at 110. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 109. 
 51. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An 
Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 141 (2008) [hereinafter Rise of the Financial Advisors]. 
 52. Id. at 142. 
 53. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I worked for this firm before 
becoming an academic. 
 54. Rise of the Financial Advisors, supra note 51, at 152-53. 
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II. THE DATASET 
I begin with the dataset I collected for the American Bankruptcy 
Institute’s chapter 11 Fee Study.55 This dataset includes cases that were 
originally filed in 2004, and the data within each dataset comes from 
publicly available court filings that were primarily collected from 
PACER.56 
The dataset is non-random, comprising all 2004 bankruptcy cases 
listed in the “Major Bankruptcies” database on 
www.bankruptcydata.com (published by New Generation Research, 
Inc.), except for cases initially filed under chapter 7 and not converted to 
chapter 11, and cases filed under former section 304 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.57 
Two broad types of professional fee data were collected: debtor 
professional expenses and committee professional expenses. In 
particular, under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code, all professionals 
retained by either the debtor or an official committee, most often a 
creditor’s committee, must file fee applications with the court before 
they can be paid from estate funds.58 A similar rule applies to 
professionals retained by examiners or trustees, and the datasets also 
include that information.59 Bankruptcy-related professional fees incurred 
in the days just before the bankruptcy filing are reported on the debtor’s 
statement of financial affairs,60 and thus are also included in the present 
study. Professional fees incurred by creditors who have a contractual 
right to charge such fees to the debtor—such as secured lenders–are not 
                                                                                                                                         
 55. ABI chapter 11 Fee Study, supra note 44; Lubben (2008), supra note 45. The 
ABI chapter 11 Fee Study is available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020477 and is 
extensively discussed in Lubben (2008), supra note 45. 
 56. PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, http://pacer.psc.uscourts. 
gov/. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123, 2148 (2002) (discussing the role of PACER in 
modern scholarship). 
 57. Section 304 was repealed in 2005 as part of the enactment of new chapter 15. 
Both section 304 and new chapter 15 deal with the recognition of foreign bankruptcy 
proceedings in the United States. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 713 (2005). 
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Statement of Financial Affairs, U.S. BANKR. CT., available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_007_0410.
pdf. 
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included in this study, inasmuch as these sorts of reimbursement 
obligations are not subject to section 330 and are therefore not subject to 
express disclosure.61 
The datasets also include a wealth of related information about the 
debtors’ cases:  more than 700 variables were coded in each case. 
* * * 
The present study modifies the original ABI dataset in several key 
respects. For example, in the original study, cases were followed for two 
years or until they ceased to be in chapter 11 because either a plan was 
confirmed, the case was converted to chapter 7, or the case was 
dismissed.62 This approach to the data was necessitated by the required 
timeline for producing the final report under the ABI chapter 11 Fee 
Study. 
To examine whether this censoring had any effects on the data, I 
revisited the cases that were still pending in chapter 11 when the original 
study was completed and recoded them to include their final resolution 
and all professional expenses incurred through that resolution. 
Additionally, I revamped my approach to measuring the debtor’s 
assets and liabilities in the dataset. First, asset and liability information 
was taken from Bloomberg. Typically this information comes from the 
most recent pre-bankruptcy Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) filings, but Bloomberg also provides financial information for 
certain larger privately held companies in the sample (e.g., Tower 
Records). Then, only if financial information on the debtor was 
unavailable on Bloomberg, would assets and liability information be 
taken from the debtor’s schedules. This change was done for a variety of 
reasons, most notably to reduce the risk that debtor size—a key factor in 
this study—would be misspecified for the corporate groups in the 
dataset. This is because schedules are often filed on a corporation by a 
corporation basis, whereas chapter 11 costs are typically paid by the 
group as a whole, and only afterwards allocated to specific corporate 
entities for accounting purposes. 
Following these changes to the datasets, the dataset is comprised 
solely of 97 chapter 11 cases filed in 2004. As would be expected, Table 
1 reveals that Delaware and New York are the most prevalent 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional Fees in Corporate 
Bankruptcies: Data, Analysis, and Evaluation (2011) [hereinafter Professional Fees]. 
 62. The study captured professional fees incurred during the study period, even if 
approved or requested outside of the study period. 
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jurisdictions in the sample, each representing approximately 14% of the 
dataset. 
In this paper, all data analysis was done using Stata64/SE version 
10.1 for OSX. Add-on modules for Stata were also used, and are 
discussed when appropriate. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Table 1:  Case Frequencies by District 
 
District Freq. Plot of freq. 
C.D. Cal. 4 **** 
Colorado 1 *
D. Ariz. 1 * 
D. Del. 13 ************* 
D. Mass. 2 ** 
D. Me. 1 * 
D. Minn. 1 *
D. Nev. 1 * 
D. Vt. 1 * 
D. N.H. 1 * 
D. N.J. 3 *** 
E.D. La. 1 * 
E.D. Mich. 3 ***
E.D. Mo. 1 * 
E.D. Tex. 1 * 
E.D. Va. 1 *
E.D. Wash. 1 * 
M.D. Pa. 1 * 
M.D. Florida 3 *** 
N.D. Cal. 3 *** 
N.D. Tex. 4 **** 
N.D. N.Y. 1 *
N.D. Alabama 1 * 
N.D. Georgia 3 *** 
N.D. Illinois 4 ****
S.D. Fla. 5 ***** 
S.D. Ind. 2 ** 
S.D. N.Y. 14 ************** 
S.D. Ohio 4 **** 
S.D. Texas 3 *** 
W.D. La 4 ****
W.D. Pa. 1 * 
W.D. Tex. 2 ** 
W.D. Va. 1 * 
W.D. Wash. 1 * 
W.D. N.Y. 1 * 
W.D. Missouri 2 ** 
  97    
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A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Figure 2 illustrates the basic financial characteristics of the debtors 
in the dataset.63 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 2, and many of the figures that follow, the data has been 
transformed using a log base 10 transformation. This is done to account 
for the extreme skew of the underlying data, which would otherwise 
make many of the graphs unusable.64 The logged numbers are easily 
interpreted as 1 followed by the number of zeros in the logged value—
so that “6” in Figure 2 is the equivalent of $1,000,000. That is, “1” 
followed by six zeros. 
                                                                                                                                         
 63. Operating income is taken from Question 1 of the debtor’s Statement of 
Financial Affairs, which requires the debtor to report “the gross amount of income the 
debtor has received . . . from operation of the debtor’s business.” Official Form B7, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Bk%20Forms%20Dir%20 
1209/Form_7_Stmt_Financial_Affairs_INSTRUCTIONS_1209.pdf. The phrasing of 
this question is somewhat ambiguous, and might lead to inclusion of something more 
than operating income. For example, if the emphasis is on “received,” the debtor might 
report all sales proceeds or revenues in this field, without deducting the cost of such 
sales. 
 64. See infra Figure 9. 
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Table 2B sets forth descriptive statistics for the dataset. The 
prototypical case is one filed by the debtor. Involuntary cases account 
for about 2% of all cases. The cases in the dataset are, on average, 
solvent. This highlights a relatively unique aspect of chapter 11—there 
is no formal solvency requirement to file a case, and simple cash flow 
problems or anticipated insolvency can be enough to justify a petition. 
More than 55% of the cases in the dataset are publicly traded firms 
required to file reports with the SEC. 
These cases are likely to involve creditors committees, as 77% had 
at least one committee and about 27% of the cases involved sales of 
most of the debtor’s assets, typically before confirmation of a plan.65 
Similarly, the average debtor saw more than 236 claims filed against it. 
This in turn leads to the retention of a claims agent in 51% of the dataset 
cases.66 
 
 
Table 2B: Descriptive Statistics             
  Mean SE of mean Median N 
Assets 706,000,000 213,000,000 91,700,000 94 
Debts 623,000,000 170,000,000 80,000,000 94 
Op. Income 242,000,000 102,000,000 7,573,344 77 
Publicly Traded 0.567 0.051 1.000 97 
Involuntary 0.021 0.015 0.000 97 
Prepackaged 0.041 0.020 0.000 97 
DIP Loan 0.433 0.051 0.000 97 
# Lawsuits 52.635 21.440 9.000 74 
Trustee 0.082 0.028 0.000 97 
Examiner 0.062 0.025 0.000 97 
Monthly Comp. 0.474 0.051 0.000 97 
Ord. Course Prof. 0.402 0.050 0.000 97 
                                                                                                                                         
 65. These quick “363 sales,” named after the relevant section of the Bankruptcy 
Code, were recently the subject of much controversy when used by General Motors and 
Chrysler, but the present datasets show that 363 sales are very much a big case 
phenomenon.  See generally Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, Sales or Plans:  
A Comparative Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591 
(2011). 
 66. A claims agent is a data-management company that takes over the job of 
receiving and organizing claims filed in a chapter 11 case. Often, a large debtor will 
want such an agent because they can provide a more sophisticated analysis of the 
claims, and have the facilities to integrate the claims management process with the 
debtor’s financial reports, as well as the claims objections process. The debtor pays the 
expense of hiring such a firm. 
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Claims Agent 0.474 0.051 0.000 97 
363 Motion 0.268 0.045 0.000 97 
Committee 0.773 0.043 1.000 97 
Plan Filed 0.763 0.043 1.000 97 
# Classes in Plan 8.776 0.856 8.000 58 
Sub-debt Class 0.291 0.062 0.000 55 
Exit Fin. 0.204 0.055 0.000 54. 
Fraud 0.093 0.030 0.000 97 
# Claims 236.705 120.011 44.000 78 
First Day Papers 0.515 0.051 1.000 97 
# Lift Stay Motions 1.788 0.304 1.000 85 
# C/D Motions 0.632 0.095 0.000 87 
# Trustee Motions 0.500 0.120 0.000 88 
Ret. Bonus Motion 0.361 0.049 0.000 97 
3+ Extra Debtor Profs. 0.598 0.050 1.000 97 
Fin. Adv. In Case 0.588 0.050 1.000 97 
Days in chapter 11 410.856 33.626 317.000 97 
More information on the variables can be found in Appendix 2B, at the end of the section. 
  
In these cases, more than 43% of debtors utilized post-bankruptcy 
(“DIP”) financing and 40% of the debtors sought court authorization to 
pay certain non-bankruptcy professionals outside of the normal 
bankruptcy process.67 
The typical case dataset debtor took just over 410 days (1.13 years) 
to travel through chapter 11.68 As shown in Figure 3, confirmed plans 
are quite common among these cases.69 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. Professor LoPucki has recently argued that these “Ordinary Course 
Professional” motions are “illegal.” Routine Illegality, supra note 6, at 427, 434. The 
thesis of the LoPucki article is contested and criticized in Martin J. Bienenstock et al., 
Response to Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee Practices, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 549 (2009) [hereafter Response to Routine Illegality]. 
 68. Contrasted with Warner’s classic study of railroad bankruptcies, which found 
an average length of 13 years, it appears that chapter 11, despite its reputation, is a 
significant improvement over its predecessors. See Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: 
Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 340 (1977). 
 69. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 600-01 
(1993) (reporting 96% confirmation rate for bankruptcies of large public companies). A 
dismissed case leaves the federal bankruptcy system, leaving creditors to their rights 
under state debtor-creditor law. Typically this involves individual creditor-by-creditor 
collection of the debts. 
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Of ultimate importance for this study, is that the cases in the dataset 
involve many professionals. 59% of the cases involve at least one 
retained financial adviser, and more than half of the cases employed at 
least three additional professionals, beyond their primary bankruptcy 
counsel, to help them navigate chapter 11. 
B. DEFINING DEBTOR SIZE 
Figure 3 
Case Outcomes 
 
 
Given the importance of debtor size to any examination of chapter 
11, it is remarkable that the question of how to measure size is so 
infrequently addressed.70 In many of the early studies of professional 
fees, the debtor’s asset or market value was used without further 
discussion.71 Of course, even if one settles on asset size as the measure 
of debtor size, the next question is which measure of asset size? Assets 
are often reported several different ways through the course of a chapter 
11 case, depending on the particular context and the relevant legal and 
accounting rules.72 
                                                                                                                                         
 70. See Finance’s Theoretical Divide, supra note 19. 
 71. See, e.g., id. at 1131; Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, The 
Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 33 J. 
FIN. 383, 386 (1978); Reply to Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 720.  
 72. Professional Fees, supra note 61, at 10-13. 
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Lynn LoPucki is one of the few scholars to address the issue 
directly, and he has typically settled on assets listed on the petition as 
the best measure of debtor size.73 This measure only works for publicly 
traded debtors, which are the focus of his studies, as other debtors are 
not required to complete Exhibit A to the petition.74 Indeed, many of the 
routinely utilized measures of size, including equity or debt market 
values, cannot be generalized to the universe of debtor firms that are not 
required to disclose information and not subject to transparent market 
pricing. 
In a more recent article, Professor LoPucki has turned to the 
number of debtor employees.75 The latter measure would seem to treat 
certain industries as inherently bigger—such as retail and transportation 
firms—while discounting the size of debtors in areas that are less labor 
intensive. For example, while Lehman Brothers was among the largest 
recent chapter 11 cases by asset value, measuring size by number of 
employees would treat United Airlines as a larger chapter 11 case.76 
In the past I have expressed concern that using assets alone tends to 
ignore cases in which debtors seek bankruptcy after a sudden drop in 
asset values77—are these firms better treated according to their new size, 
or the size when they created their businesses and capital structures?78 In 
addition, a debtor’s inability to value its assets upon bankruptcy can lead 
to understatement of size if the debtor reports a key asset’s value as 
“unknown.”79 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. Rise of the Financial Advisors, supra note 51. 
 74. Exhibit A to the bankruptcy petition, only required of publicly traded firms, 
requires information regarding the debtor’s publicly traded securities and basic balance 
sheet information. See Exhibit “A” to Voluntary Petition, U.S. BANKR. CT., available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK_Forms_1207/B_001A_0997f.pdf. 
 75. Professional Overcharging, supra note 3. 
 76. See Lynn M. LoPucki, BANKR. RES. DATABASE, available at http://lopucki.law. 
ucla.edu/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). When ranked by employees, United Airlines is the 
seventh largest case, Kmart was the largest and Lehman is not even among the top 
twenty-five.  Id. 
 77. Lubben (2000), supra note 29, at 521.  
 78. Warner, supra note 68, at 340-41, makes a similar point when he argues that 
firm size should be measured at the point of the financing decision, rather than at 
bankruptcy, when firm value has undoubtedly already fallen. Although Altman rightly 
notes that the extremely gradual decline in value that Warner found was undoubtedly a 
product of the specific industry Warner studied; see also Edward I. Altman, A Further 
Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1070 (1984). 
 79. See Lubben (2000), supra note 29, at 521. 
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To address these concerns, I have, in the past, used the sum of the 
debtor’s assets and debts to measure size. But doing so ostensibly 
inflates debtor size, and depresses costs relative to that size, occasionally 
resulting in confusion. It also makes my figures difficult to compare 
with prior articles that compare cost to asset value or similar measures 
of size. Consequently, to increase comprehension and comparability 
with prior works, I instead use the average of assets and debts. 
Figure 5 shows the simple bivariate relationship between chapter 
11 cost and this measure of debtor size, while Figure 4 shows the rough 
similarity between several obvious measures of debtor size. 
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Appendix 2B: Variable Descriptions
  
Assets Debtor’s total assets
Debts Debtor’s total debts
Op. Income “Operating Income,” as reported in Statement of Financing Affairs 
(SOFA). May not track “operating income” as understood by 
accountants because of wording of question in SOFA (i.e., might 
include all income received). 
Publicly Traded Dummy variable; yes indicates debtor files reports with SEC as of 
petition date 
Involuntary Dummy variable; yes indicates involuntary petition
Prepackaged Dummy variable; yes indicates prepack case (pre-bankruptcy voting on 
plan) 
DIP Loan Dummy variable; yes indicates post-bankruptcy financing approved by 
court 
# Lawsuits Total number of lawsuits pending against debtor, as reported in SOFA 
Trustee Dummy variable; yes indicates trustee appointed
Examiner Dummy variable; yes indicates examiner appointed
Monthly Comp. Dummy variable; yes indicates court approved partial payment of 
professionals on monthly basis (often 80%), pending quarterly fee 
applications 
Ord. Course Prof. Dummy variable; yes indicates court approved abbreviated procedures 
for employment and retention of non-bankruptcy professionals billing 
under set amount. 
Claims Agent Dummy variable; yes indicates court approved use of claims agent to 
administer claims register 
363 Motion Dummy variable; yes indicates sale of all or substantially all assets 
before plan 
Committee Dummy variable; yes indicates appointment of at least one committee 
Plan Filed Dummy variable; yes indicates a plan was filed, whether or not 
confirmed by court 
# Classes in Plan Total number of classes in reorganization plan
Sub-debt Class Dummy variable; yes indicates at least one class of subordinated debt 
(typically bond debt) 
Exit Fin. Dummy variable; yes indicates plan includes new financing for debtor 
Fraud Dummy variable; yes indicates evidence of fraud or breach of duty by 
management prebankruptcy 
# Claims Total number of claims filed in debtor’s case
First Day Papers Dummy variable; yes indicates “first day” motions were filed. First day 
motions request permission to deviate from the Bankruptcy Code or 
other regulations because compliance would undermine the going 
concern value of the debtor. For example, a typical motion requests 
permission to immediately pay employees their priority wage claims, 
instead of waiting for confirmation of a plan. 
# Lift Stay Motions Total number of motions to lift the automatic stay
# C/D Motions Total number of motions to convert (to chapter 7) or dismiss the case 
# Trustee Motions Total number of motions to appoint a trustee
Ret. Bonus Motion Dummy variable; yes indicates a motion to pay retention bonuses to 
management or employees during the case 
3+ Extra Debtor 
Profs. 
Dummy variable; yes indicates that the debtor retained three or more 
professionals beyond bankruptcy counsel 
Fin. Adv. In Case Dummy variable; yes indicates that at least one financial advisor was 
retained in the case (by debtor or committee) 
Days in chapter 11 Total days spent in chapter 11 before conversion, dismissal, or 
confirmation of a plan 
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III. MODELING THE COST OF CHAPTER 11 
In this section of the paper, I develop a general model of 
professional fees in chapter 11 cases, a model that I then extend to the 
specific case of attorneys and financial advisers in subsequent chapters. 
A. MEASURING CHAPTER 11 COST 
In a chapter 11 case, all professionals that are to be paid with estate 
funds are required to have their retention approved at the start of the 
case.80 The bulk of those professionals81 are also required to have their 
fees and expenses approved by the bankruptcy court before being paid 
from the estate.82 In short, there is both ex ante and ex post oversight of 
most professionals by the bankruptcy court. 
The debtor’s bankruptcy estate is responsible for paying for all 
professionals it retained in the case.83 In addition, the estate is 
responsible for paying the expenses of any professionals retained by 
official—that is, court appointed—committees in the case.84 Finally, the 
estate is also responsible for paying any court appointed “neutrals,” and 
their professionals, including trustees and examiners.85 All of these 
expenses count as costs of administration of the estate, and are thus 
entitled to priority payment.86 
The datasets used in this study capture the following fee 
information of each debtor in the sample: 
 The fees and expenses of the debtor’s lead bankruptcy 
counsel; 
 The fees and expenses of the debtor’s local counsel (if 
any);87 and  
                                                                                                                                         
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2006). 
 81. In larger cases, it has become common to excuse non-bankruptcy “ordinary 
course” professionals from the formal retention and fee approval system, although this 
practice is the subject of some controversy. Routine Illegality, supra note 6, at 436. 
 82. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 330, 331. 
 83. Id. § 330. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. §§ 507(a)(2), 503(b)(2). 
 87. In the United States, attorneys are licensed to practice on a state-by-state basis. 
Large corporate debtors typically hire “lead” counsel from New York, Chicago, or Los 
Angeles. But if the debtor’s bankruptcy case is filed in a different jurisdiction (e.g., 
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 The fees and expenses of up to eight additional debtor 
professionals, beyond lead and local bankruptcy counsel. 
The study also collects the following information for up to three 
official committees in each case: 
 The fees and expenses of the committee’s lead bankruptcy 
counsel; 
 The fees and expenses of the committee’s local bankruptcy 
counsel (if any); and 
 The fees and expenses of up to two additional professionals 
for each committee, beyond lead and local bankruptcy 
counsel. 
The number limitations on the “extra professional” fields are a 
result of the Excel data entry form, which was designed in consultation 
with various bankruptcy professionals. Although before the study it was 
widely felt that eight additional professional debtor fields were 
sufficient, and all eight fields were utilized in seventeen cases; it can be 
supposed that in some of these cases there were more than eight 
additional debtor professionals retained. The majority of cost will be 
captured in these cases, as the principal professionals will be captured. 
The datasets also include information on the costs of trustees, 
examiners, and fee examiners, along with the costs of professionals 
retained by these parties.88 The study also captures the pre-bankruptcy 
professional fees and expenses paid by the debtors and reported on their 
statements of financial affairs. 
The sum of all these fees and expenses form the measure of chapter 
11 costs used throughout this study. 
In the dataset, the average case incurred over $8.4 million ($3.7 
million median) in total professional costs.89 Alternatively stated, the 
                                                                                                                                         
Delaware) the debtor will also have to hire “local” counsel admitted to the bar of that 
state, unless the firm in question has a local office in the state in question. 
 88. This does not include fees and expenses of claims agents or professionals 
retained under an “ordinary course professional” motion. Claims agents are typically 
paid in the “ordinary course” and thus do not file fee applications with the court. 
 89.   
Dataset: 
 Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Total cost $8,408,187.00 $1,380,296.00 $5,667,953.00 $11,100,000.00 
Cost per 
day 
$33,708.62 $5,710.50 $22,371.84 $45,045.40 
n=96     
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debtors in this dataset incurred almost $34,000 ($11,795) per day in 
chapter 11. However, costs are not incurred in a uniform manner, indeed 
the cost of a chapter 11 case seems to ebb and flow with certain key 
events (petition filing, plan confirmation), and in many cases it is 
heavily front-loaded. This latter effect may reflect the extra work 
involved in stabilizing the debtor’s business after a chapter 11 filing. 
Frequent references to a professional’s “burn rate” are thus 
misleading, inasmuch as it implies a fixed or constant cost to chapter 11. 
The “lumpiness” of chapter 11 costs can be seen in Figure 6, which 
shows the month-by-month charges of lead bankruptcy counsel in a 
single Delaware chapter 11 case.90 
 
 
Debtor professionals were, on average, responsible for 63.1% 
(64.7% median) of total cost. 91 Committee costs were 40.2% (32.3%) of 
debtor costs, or 22.5% (21.9%) of total chapter 11 costs. 
                                                                                                                                         
 
 90. Note that the first fee application includes two months. 
 91.  
Big case dataset: 
 Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Comm. over Debtor (n=72) 0.402 0.032 0.338 0.466 
Comm. over Total (n=72) 0.225 0.011 0.203 0.247 
Debtor over Total (n=93) 0.631 0.021 0.589 0.672 
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Throughout bankruptcy literature, it has become common to report 
fees as a percentage of debtor size.92 The advantage of such a measure is 
obvious – namely it provides an easy “rule of thumb” for considering 
whether a particular case is above or below the average cost. But as 
Professor LoPucki has noted, the relationship between debtor size and 
cost is highly sensitive to the size of the cases under study, meaning that 
use of such “rules of thumb” will often result in substantial errors.93 
 
 
This same effect is evident in the present study, where the 
average cost of the smallest quartile of cases is 10% of size,94 while in 
the largest cases cost is 2% of size. Based on the ratios of cost to size 
shown on Table 7B, it appears that there are substantial economies of 
scale to chapter 11 cases, a relationship that is also examined in Figure 
7A.95 The relationship between size and standardized cost demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                         
 92. See, e.g., Finance’s Theoretical Divide, supra note 19, at 1131, n.8 (citing 
studies). 
 93. Professional Overcharging, supra note 3, at 1003-04. 
 94. Defined as the average of assets and debts. See supra Part III.  
 95. The outlier at the top of the graph represents the chapter 11 case of Mid-State 
Raceway, Inc., the owner of a horse-racing track and affiliated hotel in northern New 
York State. In re Mid-State Raceway, Inc., No. 04-65746, 2006 WL 4050809 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006) (opinion confirming chapter 11 plan). It is unclear from 
reviewing the case file why the case appears so relatively expensive, although gambling 
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a strong downward trend, further suggesting that there may be 
significant fixed costs to chapter 11, and thus a declining cost for the 
largest of debtors. 
 
Table 7B:  Standardized chapter 11 Cost by Size Quartiles (Big Case Dataset) 
 Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Total cost over size 
1 (smallest) 0.101 0.017 0.067 0.135 
2 0.089 0.015 0.059 0.119 
3 0.042 0.006 0.029 0.055 
4 0.021 0.006 0.01 0.033 
Mean debtor size (USD)  
1 7,080,907.00 981,618.40 5,131,608.00 9,030,207.00 
2 44,700,000.00 4,120,754.00 36,500,000.00 52,900,000.00 
3 242,000,000.00 21,800,000.00 198,000,000.00 285,000,000.00 
 2,410,000,000.00  
4 0.00 609,000,000.00 1,200,000,000.00 3,620,000,000.00 
n=94  
 
B. DETERMINANTS OF COST 
Figure 8 begins the consideration of this topic by plotting the 
various factors that might influence the overall cost of chapter 11 on 
a graph that shows the bivariate relationship between cost and debtor 
size. A review of the graph suggests that cases with committees and 
363 sales might be cheaper, while New York and Delaware cases 
might be more expensive. But because the relationships might be 
complex, it is hard to draw definitive conclusions from a simple 
review of bivariate relationships. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
is heavily regulated in the United States and it may be that this extra regulation resulted 
in additional cost. 
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 Figure 8 also shows that the bivariate relationship between size 
and cost is not linear—flattening out somewhat on the right side among 
the biggest cases. Almost every case larger than $1 billion (log 9) falls 
below the regression line, suggesting costs are lower than would be 
predicted by a direct linear relationship. As I show in the final models 
below, there is an element of complexity in these cases that is not 
captured by size alone. An oversimplified model ignores this non-
linearity and puts too much stress on the size variable. By modeling 
complexity distinct from size, the models shown on Table 10 address 
this aspect of cost. 
* * * 
Debtor size is the most obvious determinant of the cost of chapter 
11. All else equal, a larger firm will be more expensive to reorganize 
because it has more contracts, employees, assets and other issues to deal 
with in its bankruptcy case, and professionals typically charge clients 
based on either the actual or estimated amount of time a particular task 
will demand. 
This might also suggest that the length of a chapter 11 case should 
determine its cost, although to some degree this conflates the total 
number of professional hours a particular case requires with the duration 
of the case. At least in larger chapter 11 cases, the total number of hours 
expended on a particular case is a function of how many hours a 
particular professional expends on that case, the hourly rates charged, 
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and the number of professionals working on the matter. Only the first 
factor is evidently affected by the case duration.96 
Thus, I would hypothesize that debtor size should have a positive 
effect on cost, and, time should have little or no effect on cost. But we 
should also consider that size, like time, is a kind of “catch all” factor 
that probably acts as a proxy for factors that can be more clearly 
modeled. Thus, we should expect size to decrease in overall importance 
in more elaborate models. 
Several prior studies have found that prepackaged chapter 11 cases 
incurred lower professional fees, although these studies typically do not 
consider professional fees incurred before the bankruptcy petition is 
filed with the court.97 As noted in Lubben (2000), the design of these 
studies may capture nothing more than time shifting of professional fees 
in prepackaged cases.98 And while this study captures pre-bankruptcy 
professional fees reported on the statement of financial affairs, that 
statement is often not filed in prepackaged cases, meaning that this study 
would suffer from a similar difficulty.99 
But under the Bankruptcy Code,100 attorneys are required to 
disclose compensation they received before the petition was filed, and as 
part of the additional data collection done for this study, I gathered this 
information for the attorneys’ retention applications in prepackaged 
cases.101 Thus, I hypothesize that filing a prepackaged case will have no 
effect on overall cost, but rather results in the shifting of costs, such as 
the cost of drafting a plan, to the pre-bankruptcy period.102 
                                                                                                                                         
 96. In the ABI chapter 11 Fee Study, I found no relationship between time and 
total cost. But that study only covered large chapter 11 cases for two years, so there 
might have been a relationship that was hidden by the study design. Accordingly, I will 
re-examine case duration in the present model. 
 97. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tashjian et al., supra note 2. 
 98. Lubben (2000), supra note 29, at 516-17. 
 99. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of 
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 518-19 (1999). 
 100. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) (2006). 
 101. This approach will still underestimate the total cost of prepackaged cases, 
inasmuch as it does not capture the costs of any “ad hoc” bondholder committees or 
financial advisers paid by the debtor before the case was commenced. 
 102. As it turns out, the conventional wisdom is not supported by this dataset even 
without inclusion of the prepetition fees. Rather, as discussed in connection with Table 
10.1, infra, prepackaged cases only appear “cheaper” if the prepetition fees are omitted 
and intra-jurisdictional correlations are ignored. 
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Other similar factors that might reduce cost include 363 sales, 
which should somewhat reduce the difficulty of plan negotiations by 
converting the debtor’s assets into cash, and conversion or dismissal of 
the chapter 11 case.103 The latter two factors would bring the debtor’s 
chapter 11 expenses to a quick end, albeit with uncertain effects on the 
debtor’s total costs of financial distress, depending on the relative costs 
of state law collection and chapter 7 liquidation.104 However, that is 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
Additionally, the complexity of the chapter 11 case, distinct from 
the debtor’s size, might influence cost. One indicator of complexity is 
the debtor’s retention of additional professionals beyond bankruptcy 
counsel. In this paper, I use the debtor’s retention of more than three 
additional professionals as an indicator of a particularly complex case. 
This complexity might come from the debtor’s financial structure, or it 
might simply come from the scale of the debtor’s business. For example, 
even a purely domestic debtor often needs to retain counsel familiar 
with the laws of the individual states in which it operates. 
In addition, one might surmise that there is a group of extremely 
complex cases that are even more complex than the typical large chapter 
11 case – that is, cases like United Airlines or Lehman Brothers might 
be different from large but simple chapter 11 cases.105 
In this study, I utilize several dummy variables to capture these 
extremely complex cases. First, I use a variable that asks if the debtor 
implemented an “ordinary course professionals” (“OCP”) process in the 
case. As previously discussed, these motions essentially ask for an 
exception to the usual rule that all debtor professionals must file formal 
retention and fee applications before they can be retained or paid.106 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. See generally Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 in Transition – From Boom to Bust 
and Into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 385 (2007). 
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 
 105. There are two ways of looking at this aspect of extremely large chapter 11 
cases: either one can consider it additional complexity, as I do in this study, or one can 
consider it an aspect of size that is not captured by simple balance-sheet measures of 
size. There is no obvious way of distinguishing between these two interpretations of the 
effects modeled herein. 
 106. Lubben (2008), supra note 45. 
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Instead, the debtor asks the court to approve abbreviated procedures for 
professionals who are largely exogenous to the chapter 11 process.107 
It may seem that OCP motions should reduce the reported cost of a 
case, since an OCP system removes professionals from the total cost 
used as the dependent variable.108 But the total cost of these 
professionals is small, averaging less than $100,000 per month.109 In 
short, it is arguable that the presence or absence of an OPC motion will 
be of little import to the dependent variable. 
I also consider the interaction of this variable with the prior 
variable that asks if the debtor retained three or more professionals 
beyond bankruptcy counsel. The interaction term captures those cases 
where the debtor both implemented an OCP system and hired three or 
more professionals. The interaction variable should capture those cases 
where the debtor has highly “professionalized” its chapter 11 case—if 
we assume that the non-bankruptcy professionals are largely removed 
from the dependent variable by means of the OCP system. This variable 
should also capture the non-linearity seen among the largest cases back 
on Figure 8. 
I also include a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a 
committee was appointed in the case. Obviously the appointment of a 
committee almost directly leads to the retention of additional 
professionals, especially in larger cases.110 Beyond simply capturing the 
number of professionals in a case, however, both the committee and 
additional debtor professionals’ variables can also be seen as indicators 
of case complexity. This is especially true if we presume that the 
bankruptcy court exercises at least a minimal degree of oversight over 
the debtor’s retention of additional professionals and the appointment of 
committees. The appointment of a committee also increases the number 
of key parties that debtor’s counsel must consult, potentially increasing 
                                                                                                                                         
 107. As might be expected, this variable is correlated with debtor size (0.439; 
p<0.05). But once size is separately accounted for in the following models, the presence 
of an OCP motion can be interpreted as a complexity measure. 
 108. Lubben (2008), supra note 45. 
 109. Total cost is based on the 32 cases with available data on this point. The 
median is just over $32,000 per month. The cost of filing full retention and 
compensation applications, if the professionals were not subject to the abbreviated 
procedures, might well equal or exceed the cost of their non-bankruptcy work, which 
raises the issue of whether OCP motions might not reduce the cost of chapter 11 cases. 
 110. Lubben (2008), supra note 45. In some smaller cases, committees do not retain 
professionals. 
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overall costs in a way that is not captured by simply counting the total 
number of professionals retained in a case. 
I also consider if a claims agent has been appointed in the case. As 
my dependent variable does not include the cost of the claims agent, in 
this context the claims agent acts as a pure proxy for a complex chapter 
11 process, where the debtor anticipates the need for extra “help” when 
reconciling the claims register. 
In addition, Professor LoPucki has been extremely critical of the 
tendency to file large chapter 11 cases in New York and Delaware, 
jurisdictions that, in his view, are the sources of a large pattern of 
judicial “corruption.”111 As part of this criticism, he has suggested that 
these jurisdictions are associated with higher professional fees, as he 
asserts that the judges do not wish to drive large corporate bankruptcy 
cases to other courts.112 Accordingly, I use dummy variables to indicate 
whether or not a case was filed in New York or Delaware. Under the 
thesis implied by Professor LoPucki’s criticism, these variables should 
be positively related to cost.113 
Moreover, the financial press has recently focused on the high 
hourly rates charged by some “big city” law firms in chapter 11 cases.114 
Under the implicit thesis of these articles—namely, that high rates 
translate into higher chapter 11 costs—these high hourly rates should 
correlate with higher chapter 11 costs. On the other hand, in prior work, 
I have noted that most of the cost of a chapter 11 case comes from the 
                                                                                                                                         
 111. See generally Courting Failure, supra note 3. 
 112. Professional Fees, supra note 61.  In the United States, a large corporate debtor 
typically has a choice of where to file their bankruptcy case, because the case can be 
filed in any jurisdiction where any individual member of the corporate group might file 
a case (typically either the location of its headquarters or its state of incorporation).  
 113. Of course, LoPucki has also argued that the objectionable procedures in these 
jurisdictions have spread to other districts, which may make his thesis untestable. See 
generally Courting Failure, supra note 3. It should also imply that there is no longer 
any benefit from filing in New York or Delaware, yet debtors continue to seek out these 
jurisdictions (e.g., GM and Chrysler).  See generally Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal:  
The GM and Chrysler Cases In Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009) (discussing the 
bankruptcy cases of GM and Chrysler, both of which were filed in the S.D.N.Y. despite 
the debtors’ obvious ties to Michigan). 
 114. Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid so Well?, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010. 
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middle of the rate structure.115 I input the highest hourly rate charged by 
debtor’s counsel to examine both issues; the highest rate not only 
implicates the popular fascination with the top rate, but also addresses 
the mid-tier attorneys in that their hourly rates are likely to be highly 
correlated with the top rates, and high top rates are apt to indicate higher 
middle rates. 
Finally, it should be expected that the presence of court appointed 
neutrals in a case will increase the cost, particularly when those neutrals 
are additional costs in the reorganization process.116 Thus I consider all 
three types of neutrals—trustees, examiners, and fee examiners—that 
are coded in the datasets. Examiners, appointed to investigate and report 
on the debtor’s or some creditor’s conduct, should add to the costs of a 
case both directly and by indicating a case with a particular degree of 
tension between the debtor and its creditors.117 The effects of 
appointment of a trustee should be similar, although the effects might be 
mitigated by the fact that the trustee typically usurps the debtor and its 
professionals,118 meaning that a trustee might have a neutral effect on 
overall cost. 
Fee examiners present a more complex state of affairs. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that fee examiners should reduce cost, 
after all the primary purpose of a fee examiner is to provide a kind of 
“audit” of professional fees in a chapter case.119 But in previous work I 
found that the fee examiners actually seemed to increase cost, although 
the effect was not statistically significant.120 
This is consistent with the suspicion that the cost of fee examiners 
exceeds their benefit, at least with regard to actual fee reduction. To be 
sure, fee examiners provide some administrative benefits to the 
bankruptcy court, which might be otherwise overwhelmed by the 
number of fee applications in a large chapter 11 case. Those benefits, 
however, and whether fee examiners are the proper solution to this 
problem, are hard to gauge. Thus I hypothesize that, contrary to 
                                                                                                                                         
 115. Stephen J. Lubben, The Microeconomics of chapter 11, Part 1, 4 INT’L. CORP. 
RESCUE 31 (2007); Stephen J. Lubben, The Microeconomics of chapter 11, Part 2, 4 
INT’L. CORP. RESCUE 87 (2007). 
 116. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and The 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Of Large Public Companies, 84 AM BANKR. L.J. 1 (2010). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1104.02. 
 119. See Lowe, supra note 4. 
 120. Lubben (2008), supra note 45. 
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conventional wisdom, the appointment of a fee examiner should 
increase overall cost in the chapter 11 process. 
* * * 
Before addressing the model, I should note that I do not use three 
variables that many readers might consider especially relevant: the ratio 
of secured debt to total debt, the overall leverage of the debtor, and the 
number of classes in the debtor’s plan. The solvency or leverage of the 
debtor intuitively seems to be related to chapter 11 cost, but that 
relationship is actually quite complex upon further examination. 
For example, it may be that a debtor on the margin of solvency will 
incur more chapter 11 cost because the shareholders will have stronger 
incentives to argue about the valuation of the debtor. On the other hand, 
at some point of insolvency, further insolvency does not matter. This is 
provided it comes in the form of unsecured debt, in that the debtor likely 
does not care if its $100 million or $500 million of bond debt that gets 
discharged. 
The ratio of secured debt to overall debt might be important for 
cost, in that secured creditors have a more robust set of legal rights and 
powers under American law.121 But data on secured debt is often 
missing in the sample, driving the total number of cases down into the 
low 70s. Despite the foregoing, I did test both variables as final 
additions to the models presented here. The ratio of secured debt to 
overall debt was not significant in the model, albeit with a smaller 
sample size. And while the debtor’s asset to debt ratio was significant, it 
added little to the overall model, increasing the R-squared by 0.02, while 
providing a host of interpretive problems outlined above. 
Finally, I did not use the number of classes in the debtor’s plan as a 
proxy for complexity of capital structure, because the number of classes 
can also reflect the plan proponent’s manipulation of the chapter 11 
voting rules.122 Moreover, the capital structure of the multiple corporate 
entities that make up a single enterprise can often be classified in myriad 
                                                                                                                                         
 121. See Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1117, 1124-28 
(2002); see also Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen Lubben, Sales or Plans: A 
Comparative Account of the “New” Corporate Reorganization, 56 MCGILL L.J. 591, 
596 (2011). 
 
122.  See In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 246-47 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the rules regarding classification of claims under chapter 
11); see also Bruce A. Markell, Clueless on Classification: Towards Removing 
Artificial Limits on chapter 11 Claim Classification. 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1995). 
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ways, making the variable more reflective of the attorney that drafted or 
negotiated the plan than anything else.123 
* * * 
Table 8.1, on the next page, examines the relationship among the 
variables used in the models. As shown, several of the “complexity” 
variables are correlated with debtor size. This provides an independent 
reason to control for debtor size, even if that variable itself is not 
significant, so that the complexity measures can capture complexity 
itself, without also measuring size. 
 
 
C. THE MODEL 
To model the total cost of these large chapter 11 cases, I enter the 
foregoing variables in a series of blocks, grouping the variables by 
concept, as follows: 
 Model 1: Debtor size; 
 Model 2: Debtor size, time-related variables; 
 Model 3: Debtor size, time-related variables, complexity 
variables; 
 Model 4: Debtor size, time-related variables, complexity 
variables, mega case variables; 
 Model 5: Debtor size, time-related variables, complexity 
variables, mega case variables, court-appointed neutrals. 
Entering the variables in this manner facilitates an understanding of 
the work done by each group of explanatory factors in the larger model. 
The five models are set forth on Table 10, with descriptive statistics for 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. See Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1122.03. 
176 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
the 87 cases used in the model set forth on Appendix 10A at the end of 
this section. 
Because of extreme skewness and non-normal distributions, the 
three continuous variables—cost, size, and time—are transformed with a 
log base-10 transformation.124 Figure 9 shows the results of the 
transformations. 
Finally, throughout this study I account for the grouping of cases by 
judicial district and the potential correlation of cases on that basis by 
adjusting the standard errors to control for this effect.125 While Stata 
automatically invokes robust standard errors in connection with 
clustered standard errors, pre-testing of the regressions indicated 
heteroskedasticity,126 so robust standard errors would have been called 
for in any event.127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 124. This same transformation can be seen in several of the Figures in Chapter 3. 
 125. In particular, I use the “cluster” option in Stata to produce standard errors that 
account for judicial district correlations. See generally David M. Primo et al., 
Estimating the Impact of State Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data, 7 
STATE & POLICY Q. 446 (2007). 
 126. One of the main assumptions of OLS regression is general similarity in the 
variance of the residuals—the error terms, or the bit not explained by the regression 
model itself. If this assumption is met, there should be no pattern to the residuals plotted 
against the fitted values. If the variance of the residuals shows a pattern then the 
residual variance is said to be “heteroskedastic.” See ORLEY ASHENFELTER, ET AL., 
STATISTICS AND ECONOMETRICS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 204-05 (2003). The 
solution to the problem is to use “robust” standard errors that account for the issue. See 
generally Halbert White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator 
and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980). 
 127. As shown, infra, Appendix 10C, these measures appear to have addressed the 
heteroskedasticity. 
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The first model considers the simple bivariate relationship 
between cost and size, a relationship that has already been shown 
graphically in several of the prior figures. As shown, just under half of 
the total variance in chapter 11 cost can be explained by the debtor’s 
size alone.128 
Model 2, which introduces the time-related variables into the 
model, explains an additional 10% of the variance in chapter 11 costs. 
Conversion of the case to chapter 7, case dismissal, and time spent in 
chapter 11 are not significant factors in determining the cost of chapter 
11. Conversion of the case will be significant by Model 5, however. 
                                                                                                                                         
 128. Since version 5, when the clustering commands were updated, Stata has not 
provided adjusted R-squares with clustered standard errors. On Table 10, I have hand-
calculated adjusted R-squares for those readers that would like to see them. 
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Table 10: Model of chapter 11 Costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log of 
total case 
cost 
Log of 
total case 
cost 
Log of 
total case 
cost 
Log of
total case 
cost 
Log of  
total case  
cost 
Log of debtor size 0.573*** 0.575*** 0.277* 0.213 0.232 
 (0.0866) (0.0874) (0.112) (0.120) (0.122) 
Case converted to ch. 7 -0.447 -0.341 -0.340 -0.454* 
 (0.309) (0.224) (0.194) (0.198) 
Case dismissed -0.607 0.0169 0.0338 0.0495 
 (0.323) (0.213) (0.202) (0.216) 
Prepackaged Case -0.114 0.0774 0.0318 -0.0289 
 (0.257) (0.296) (0.345) (0.340) 
363 Motion 0.0224 0.0342 0.0463 0.0424 
 (0.130) (0.105) (0.0999) (0.0995) 
Log of days in chapter 11 0.429 0.185 0.140 0.0948 
 (0.211) (0.182) (0.163) (0.189) 
3+ professionals 0.591*** 0.590*** 0.629*** 
 (0.160) (0.141) (0.140) 
OCP system 0.672*** 0.545*** 0.628*** 
 (0.160) (0.147) (0.149) 
Interaction, OCP & 3+  -0.367* -0.320* -0.401* 
 (0.159) (0.156) (0.169) 
Official committee 0.250 0.290 0.237 
 (0.181) (0.164) (0.174) 
Claims agent 0.413** 0.274 0.293* 
 (0.132) (0.138) (0.129) 
Case from SDNY -0.0960 -0.0855 
 (0.0748) (0.0764) 
Delaware case -0.212** -0.179* 
 (0.0715) (0.0853) 
Highest hourly rate  0.00110* 0.000923* 
 (0.000469) (0.000428) 
Trustee 0.230 
 (0.158) 
Examiner 0.635** 
 (0.194) 
Fee examiner 0.0469 
 (0.193) 
Constant 1.876** 0.898 2.861** 2.979*** 3.003** 
 (0.656) (1.064) (0.886) (0.788) (0.859) 
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 
R2 0.478 0.586** 0.800*** 0.830*** 0.851* 
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.555 0.771  0.797   0.815 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; se adjusted for clustering by judicial district; mean VIF (Model 
5) 2.06 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Throughout all of the models, prepackaged cases do not appear to 
be any cheaper than traditional chapter 11 cases, once we account for at 
least some of the cases’ pre-bankruptcy costs. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that prepackaged cases shift costs into the pre-bankruptcy 
period, but do not otherwise significantly reduce the costs of 
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reorganization. Prepackaged cases are only “cheaper” chapter 11 cases 
in the sense that the fees recorded after the petition is filed are lower.129 
Table 10.1, set forth next, shows the final model from Table 10, this 
time ran without inclusion of prepetition attorneys fees for the 
prepackaged cases. The prepackaged variable is still not significant. 
 
Table 10.1: Model of chapter 11 Costs, Without Pre-bankruptcy Attorney Costs 
 (1)
 Log of total case cost -- no 
prepack pre-bankruptcy 
attny fees 
Log of debtor size 0.234
 (0.122)
Case converted to ch. 7 -0.457*
 (0.198)
Case dismissed 0.0553
 (0.216)
Prepackaged case -0.572
 (0.377)
363 motion 0.0415
 (0.100)
Log of days in ch. 11 0.0911
 (0.191)
3+ professionals 0.643***
 (0.141)
OCP system 0.659***
 (0.155)
Interaction, OCP & 3+ -0.428*
 (0.176)
Official committee 0.231
 (0.175)
Claims agent 0.293*
 (0.131)
Case from SDNY -0.0989
 (0.0816)
Delaware case -0.176
 (0.0872)
Highest hourly rate 0.000879*
 (0.000429)
Trustee 0.242
 (0.159)
Examiner 0.642**
 (0.195)
Fee examiner 0.0524
 (0.194)
Constant 3.013**
 (0.864)
Observations 87
R2 0.852
  Robust standard errors in parentheses; se adjusted for clustering by district 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
                                                                                                                                         
 129. Conceivably, prepackaged cases might also result in lower indirect costs of 
reorganization too. 
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Model 3 on Table 10 then introduces the case complexity variables 
to the model, and all of the variables are initially significant. 
Importantly, the interaction term—which captures cases that had both 
ordinary course professional systems and where the debtor retained 
three or more professionals beyond bankruptcy counsel—has a negative 
coefficient throughout the models. This suggests that subdividing 
bankruptcy work among several professionals is not itself a factor in 
increasing chapter 11 cost. 
More importantly, and contrary to popular intuition, this coefficient 
demonstrates that at some point additional complexity is actually 
associated with reduced cost. To be sure, the overall effect of having 
both three or more professionals and an OCP system is positive, as the 
sum of all three coefficients is positive. But the negative sign on the 
interaction coefficient results in a lower total cost than the simple sum of 
the two other variables. 
This comports with the effect seen in Figure 8, where the largest 
cases, on the extreme right side of the graph, are below the cost that 
would be predicted by a simple linear relationship. This points to 
economies of scale with regard to the largest cases, particularly those 
over $1 billion in size. 
Three other indicators of case complexity are also significant in this 
model, and in the final model. Retention of three or more additional 
professionals, appointment of a claims agent and use of an OCP system 
are all indicative of higher chapter 11 costs. It should be noted that 
because of the inclusion of the interaction variable, when considered 
alone the OCP and three or more professional variables should be 
interpreted as indicating those cases where only one of these factors is 
present. 
Model 3 now explains 80% of the total chapter 11 costs. Therefore, 
it presents a fairly simple model that explains the bulk of chapter 11 
costs, using readily available data.130 
Model 4 represents an incremental improvement over Model 3, but 
its results are extremely important, in that many defy conventional 
expectations. First, cases filed in the Southern District of New York or 
Delaware are not more expensive than cases filed in other jurisdictions. 
Indeed, while only the Delaware variable is independently significant, 
                                                                                                                                         
 130. The question of why the larger debtors need the additional professionals, and 
whether these professionals are part of the bankruptcy process or exogenous non-
bankruptcy actors, is something that is not easily answered with the present dataset. 
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their negative signs suggest that cases filed in these jurisdictions are 
actually less expensive than cases in other jurisdictions. This might 
reflect the benefit that comes from the familiarity these courts have with 
large chapter 11 cases. 
Moreover, the highest hourly rate charged by the debtor’s lead 
counsel is also significant. Based on my prior work, I interpret this as an 
indication that, holding all else equal, a higher hourly rate structure 
results in a higher cost. On one level this is self-evident, but it might 
also indicate an additional element of complexity that was missed by my 
prior variables, if more expensive bankruptcy counsel is hired in more 
complicated cases. Even if this is true, one would have to worry that the 
effect might be at least partially confounded by the agency problems 
inherent in large corporations, which give managers incentives to retain 
better professionals than the debtor might actually need. 
To further examine the complex relationship between size, 
complexity, and jurisdiction, I considered several additional variations 
on the final model shown on Table 10. First, I removed the complexity 
related variables (i.e., all variables added in Model 3 on Table 10). The 
sign on both jurisdictional variables remained negative, although the 
jurisdictional variables were no longer significant and the size variable 
became significant (p=0.006). The R-squared for this model was 0.708. 
This suggests that complexity is hidden in size, and probably confounds 
the jurisdictional issues too, as so many large cases are in Delaware and 
New York. Only when complexity is unpacked from size do we see the 
distinct jurisdictional effects. 
But removing the complexity variables not only puts extra stress on 
size, it also increases the likelihood that the highest hourly rate variable 
will begin to do the work of the now removed complexity variables. 
Indeed, the high hourly rate coefficient gets substantially larger in this 
altered model. 
Removing this variable from the model has several predictable 
effects. First, the coefficient on the size variable increased. Second, the 
R-squared dropped by approximately 0.10. And finally, the sign on the 
jurisdictional variables switched, as these variables themselves start to 
pick up a confused mix of jurisdictional and complexity factors that are 
not captured by any other variables in the altered model. 
As a final investigation of this important issue, I returned the 
complexity variables to the model, but removed the jurisdictional 
variables. The R-squared for this model was 84.7. All of the same 
182 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
variables that are significant in Model 5 on Table 10 remained 
significant in this revised model. 
* * * 
In Model 5, I then consider the effect of court-appointed neutrals. 
Only the appointment of an examiner is significant. This result itself is 
unsurprising, as the appointment of an examiner, who conducts an 
investigation at the expense of the bankruptcy estate, not only reflects 
the direct expense of the investigation but also the conflict that resulted 
in that investigation. 
However, the results for fee examiners again challenge the 
conventional wisdom of the financial press and the bankruptcy 
community. Appointment of a fee examiner does not significantly 
influence chapter 11 costs. Although they provide administrative 
assistance to courts, perhaps reducing the burden represented by fee 
applications; fee examiners do not reduce costs. Indeed, the positive sign 
on this coefficient is suggestive of the opposite relationship. 
Debtor size remains a significant determinant of cost throughout 
the early models, although as predicted its importance in the model 
declines as further factors are introduced. By the final model, size is not 
significant (p=0.066).131 I suggest that prior papers that relied on size 
were in fact modeling a bundle of size-related concepts, like complexity 
of the chapter 11 case. 
This should not be taken to mean that size has no relationship to 
cost. Rather, size included alone captures something more than size 
alone.132 Only by unpacking the various size related concepts, and 
separately modeling the same, can the determinants of chapter 11 cost 
be fully understood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 131. Throughout I use p=0.05 as my standard of statistical significance. 
 132. As shown on Appendix 10B, infra, the effect is not the result of collinearity 
between size and the newly introduced variables, despite the bivariate correlation 
between the variables shown on Table 8.1. 
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Figure 10.2 
Table 10.2: Revised Models of chapter 11 Costs  
 
 (1) (2)
 Log of total case cost Log of total case cost 
Case converted to chapter 7 -0.441*** -0.423**
 (0.119) (0.132)
3+ professionals 0.709*** 0.663***
 (0.154) (0.140)
OCP system 0.662*** 0.621***
 (0.169) (0.128)
Interaction, OCP & 3+ -0.301 -0.342*
 (0.218) (0.154)
Claims agent 0.372** 0.299*
 (0.109) (0.111)
Delaware case -0.134* -0.157**
 (0.0586) (0.0488)
Highest hourly rate 0.00130*** 0.000770
 (0.000290) (0.000401)
Examiner 0.663** 0.701**
 (0.191) (0.199)
Log of debtor size 0.249*
 (0.109)
Constant 4.938*** 3.349***
 (0.175) (0.652)
Observations 87 87
R2 0.765 0.817*
Robust standard errors in parentheses; se adjusted for clustering by district; mean VIF (model 2) 
2.11  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The limited independent effect of debtor size can be seen on Table 
10.2. The first model includes all variables that were significant 
(p<0.05) from Model 5 on Figure 9. With just this handful of 
variables—not including debtor size—we can explain more than 75% of 
the variance in chapter 11 costs. Model 2 adds debtor size. The increase 
in r-squared is significant (p=0.0293) and explains an additional five 
percent of the variance in cost. 
Interestingly, only in Model 2 does the interaction term, of three or 
more professionals with an OCP motion, become significant, which may 
suggest a previously unexplained joint effect. It perhaps reflects an 
element of complexity that the interaction term does not capture alone. 
The highest hourly rate variable also becomes insignificant in the second 
model, which may support the earlier suggestion that higher hourly rates 
are associated with larger, more complex debtors. 
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Finally, note that in all models time spent in chapter 11 is not a 
significant determinant of cost in any of the models on Table 10.133 The 
conventional wisdom that long, drawn out chapter 11 cases are directly 
linked to higher chapter 11 costs ignores the ways in which modern 
American corporate law firms are unlike the solicitors in Bleak House.134 
While the latter clearly benefited from extending the length of a case, 
the former would achieve the same end by either extending the case or 
heavily staffing the case.135 That is, chapter 11 costs are a bit like an 
American football or British rugby ball, whose overall volume does not 
change even if its width varies depending on which side is measured. 
Figure 10.3 shows the overall performance of the final model—in a 
model that perfectly predicted cost, all of the individual cases 
(represented as circles) would line up on the regression line, or within 
the confidence intervals that are also shown on Figure 10.3. In sum, the 
graph suggests that Model 5 performs reasonably well, with no obvious 
group of deviant cases. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 133. Time spent in chapter 11 does not influence the professional fees associated 
with the case. Of course, the creditors experience losses related to the time value of 
money if the case takes longer to pay out recoveries. 
 134. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).  
 135. Of course, all of this turns on a degree of cynicism about lawyers that I do not 
share, and supposes that the debtor’s management and creditors have no ability to 
prevent evident manipulation of a case’s length or overstaffing. 
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Appendix 10A: Descriptive 
Statistics for Models on Table 
10      
Number of obs. = 87 Mean Std. Min Max 
Dev.
Dependent (Log of total costs) 6.418 0.805 4.200 7.891 
Log of debtor size 7.931 0.972 5.171 9.954 
Case converted to ch. 7 0.092 0.291 0.000 1.000 
Case dismissed 0.103 0.306 0.000 1.000 
Pre-packaged case 0.046 0.211 0.000 1.000 
363 motion 0.299 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Log of days in ch. 11 2.466 0.383 1.204 3.242 
3+ professionals 0.609 0.491 0.000 1.000 
OCP system 0.402 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Interaction, OCP & 3+  0.287 0.455 0.000 1.000 
Official committee 0.782 0.416 0.000 1.000 
Claims agent 0.483 0.503 0.000 1.000 
Case from SDNY 0.149 0.359 0.000 1.000 
Delaware case 0.138 0.347 0.000 1.000 
Highest hourly rate  555.908 185.696 215.000 950.000 
Trustee 0.080 0.274 0.000 1.000 
Examiner 0.034 0.184 0.000 1.000 
Fee examiner 0.069 0.255 0.000 1.000 
Std. Dev. not adjusted for clustering 
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Appendix 10B: Collinearity Diagnostics  
for Final Model on Table 10 (Big Case Sample) 
Pairwise Correlation with Size   VIF Tolerance 
1.0000 Log of debtor size 4.500 0.222 
-0.1183 
Case converted to ch. 
7 4.050 0.247 
-0.0967 Case dismissed 2.790 0.359 
0.2052* Pre-packaged case 2.570 0.389 
-0.1043 363 motion 2.520 0.397 
-0.1419 Log of days in ch. 11 2.190 0.456 
0.3066* 3+ professionals 2.190 0.458 
0.4387* OCP system 1.990 0.503 
0.4158* Interaction, OCP & 3+ 1.920 0.522 
0.2912* Official committee 1.460 0.684 
0.5523* Claims agent 1.410 0.707 
0.0068 Case from SDNY 1.330 0.750 
0.1403 Delaware case 1.280 0.781 
0.6043* Highest hourly rate 1.270 0.784 
-0.1550 Trustee 1.260 0.796 
0.0526 Examiner 1.230 0.815 
0.1991 Fee examiner 1.120 0.897 
* p < 0.05 Mean VIF 2.060  
CONCLUSION 
Much of the rhetoric about chapter 11 professionals’ fees is in 
desperate need of a cold shower. Barring a government subsidy to 
creditors, bankruptcy systems will always involve the imposition of 
some costs on creditors—either directly or in the form of reduced 
recoveries from the estate. Presumably, the cost imposed on creditors is 
offset by the increase in recoveries creditors obtain in bankruptcy, as 
compared with state law collection actions. Whether there might not be 
a better alternative to these two extremes remains an open question, but 
critics who would demand below market professional fees in bankruptcy 
have to date neglected to consider how the operation of bankruptcy 
systems might be affected by such a move and whether such a move 
might not do more harm than good. Moreover, as I noted at the outset, 
this rhetoric tends to obscure the truly important questions. 
In this paper, I have made a small contribution toward moving the 
discussion to the key issue, namely explaining how much chapter 11 
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costs in absolute terms, while at the same time confronting long-
accepted myths. 
